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I. Introduction and Background
Consider this: an unmarked police vehicle is parked near
the intersection of 177th Street and Broadway in the
Washington Heights neighborhood of New York City.1 The
police officers inside the vehicle are surveilling a large
apartment complex. The officers are investigating an
international drug trafficking organization, and they believe
their suspect is in one of the apartments in the nearby area.
The officers do not know which apartment building, let alone
which apartment, belongs to their suspect. Rather than
1. This hypothetical is based on the facts underlying United States v.
Lambis. See United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 609 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) (detailing the process by which DEA agents used a cell-site simulator
to locate Raymond Lambis’s apartment).
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knocking on each of the apartment doors, and without first
obtaining a search warrant, the officers deploy a cell-site
simulator.2 The suspect’s phone transmits the cell phone’s
serial number and the phone’s location within the apartment
complex to the cell-site simulator. Having pinpointed their
suspect’s location, the officers proceed to 701 West 177th
Street, Apartment 55.3 The suspect’s father opens the door and
gives the officers consent to enter the apartment. The officers
arrest the suspect after seeing cocaine on the suspect’s bedside
table.
Now, consider this: police officers are investigating a
string of sexual assaults in the Washington, D.C. metro area.4
An unmarked police vehicle is parked just outside the
Minnesota Avenue Metro Station. In search of their suspect,
the officers inside the vehicle deploy a cell-site simulator,
again, without first obtaining a warrant. The suspect’s phone
connects with the cell-site simulator, and the cell-site
simulator directs the officers to the suspect’s car, which is
parked on the side of the street. The suspect and his girlfriend
are sitting in the car. After obtaining the suspect’s consent, the
officers search the suspect’s car and his person. Upon discovery
of one of the victim’s cell phones, the officers arrest the
suspect.
The question raised by both of these scenarios is whether
the officers violated the individual suspects’ Fourth
Amendment rights when the officers deployed cell-site
simulators to locate their suspects without first obtaining a
search warrant. This Note seeks to answer this question by
examining the constitutionality of law enforcement’s use of
cell-site simulators, specifically addressing whether the use of
a cell-site simulator constitutes a Fourth Amendment search
or seizure. This issue is particularly relevant in light of the

2. See infra Parts I.B and I.C (explaining how cell-site simulators
function and how law enforcement officers use them as surveillance tools).
3. Complaint at 2, United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 15-CR-00734), 2015 WL 13694512.
4. This hypothetical is based on the facts underlying Jones v. United
States. See Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 708–09 (D.C. Ct. App. 2017)
(describing police officers’ use of a cell-site simulator to locate Prince Jones).
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Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States,5 in
which the Court held that law enforcement officers must
obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause prior to
accessing historic cell-site location information (CSLI).6
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled specifically
on the issue of cell-site simulators, a number of lower courts
have held that law enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.7 For example, the
court in Maryland v. Andrews8 held that Baltimore Police
Department officers’ warrantless use of a cell-site simulator to
track a suspect to an acquaintance’s private residence violated
the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights because “people have
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in real-time
cell phone location information.”9 Similarly, the court in Jones
v. United States10 held that D.C. Metropolitan Police
Department officers’ “use of a cell-site simulator to locate Mr.
Jones’s phone” in Jones’s car, which was parked on a public
street, “invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy and was
thus a search.”11 The court in United States v. Lambis12
adopted a somewhat different approach in relying on the

5. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
6. See id. at 2221 (“Having found that the acquisition of Carpenter’s
CSLI was a search, we also conclude that the Government must generally
obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such
records.”).
7. See Jones, 168 A.3d at 713 (concluding “that the use of a cell-site
simulator to locate Mr. Jones’s phone invaded a reasonable expectation of
privacy and was thus a search”); Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 611 (concluding
that “[t]he use of a cell-site simulator constitute[d] a Fourth Amendment
search within the contemplation of Kyllo” and that “[a]bsent a search
warrant, the Government may not turn a citizen’s cell phone into a tracking
device”); Maryland v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 350 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 2016)
(holding that law enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator requires a search
warrant based on probable cause).
8. 134 A.3d 324 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 2016).
9. Id. at 327.
10. 168 A.3d 703 (D.C. Ct. App. 2017). In order to avoid confusion with
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), which is discussed later in this
Note, Jones v. United States will hereinafter be referred to as “Jones (D.C.)”.
11. Jones (D.C.), 168 A.3d at 714.
12. 197 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
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Supreme Court’s decision in Kyllo v. United States.13 The
Lambis court held that DEA agents’ use of a cell-site simulator
to track a suspect to his own apartment “was an unreasonable
search because the ‘pings’ from Lambis’s cell phone to the
nearest cell site were not readily available ‘to anyone who
wanted to look’ without the use of a cell-site simulator.”14
Although Lambis can be reconciled with Supreme Court
jurisprudence,15 this Note argues that law enforcement’s
warrantless use of cell-site simulators does not, as a general
rule, amount to a Fourth Amendment search.
This Note proposes four factors courts should consider
when asked to determine whether law enforcement’s use of a
cell-site simulator constituted a Fourth Amendment search.
The first asks courts to consider whether the cell-site
simulator surveillance infringed on a constitutionally protected
area, such as the home. The second asks courts to consider the
duration of the cell-site simulator surveillance. The third asks
courts to consider whether the cell-site simulator surveillance
was conducted actively or passively. The fourth asks courts to
focus on the nature and depth of the information obtained as a
result of the cell-site simulator surveillance. If, after analyzing
these four factors, a court concludes that law enforcement
officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search, the court must
then ask whether the search was reasonable.16 Cell-site
simulators are generally used in the “enterprise of ferreting
out crime.”17 Thus, if law enforcement’s use of a cell-site
simulator amounts to a Fourth Amendment search, that
search should be considered unreasonable, and therefore

13. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
14. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 610.
15. See infra Part III (critiquing the holdings in Andrews, Lambis, and
Jones (D.C.)).
16. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (defining
the reasonableness requirement as the ultimate touchstone and
“fundamental command” of the Fourth Amendment).
17. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (explaining
that a “neutral and detached magistrate,” rather than an officer engaged in
the “enterprise of ferreting out crime,” should be the one to determine
“[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search”).
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violative of the Fourth Amendment, if it was conducted
without a warrant.18
The remainder of this Part provides background
information regarding the development and use of cell-site
simulators at the federal, state, and local levels. Part II lays
out a general framework for analyzing Fourth Amendment
search and seizure cases. Part II.A concludes that law
enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator does not constitute a
Fourth Amendment seizure, but Part II.B argues that it may
constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Part II.B then delves
into Fourth Amendment search case law, chronicling several
key Supreme Court decisions that apply both the traditional,
physical trespass test19 and the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy test20 to various electronic surveillance techniques.
Part II.B next analyzes the three cell-site simulator cases
referenced earlier in this Part—Maryland v. Andrews, United
States v. Lambis, and Jones v. United States—and concludes
that the courts in Andrews and Jones (D.C.) came to
overly-broad conclusions in holding that law enforcement’s use
of cell-site simulators categorically violates individuals’
expectations of privacy. Part III proposes four factors courts
should consider to determine whether, on a case-by-case basis,
law enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator constitutes a
Fourth Amendment search. Part IV addresses the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement and concludes that
the warrant preference model for determining reasonableness
is best-suited to cell-site simulators.

18. See infra Part IV.B (arguing that the warrant preference model is
best-suited to cases where law enforcement officers have used cell-site
simulators).
19. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“[F]or most of
our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular
concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers,
and effects’) it enumerates.”).
20. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (proposing that a reasonable expectation of privacy requires a
person “exhibit[] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy [that] society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”).

LIMITED PRIVACY IN “PINGS”

987

A. The Development of Cell-Site Simulators
Prior to 2015, a great deal of secrecy surrounded law
enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators.21 In 2015, the
Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland
Security issued revised policies regarding the use of cell-site
simulators,22 bringing their use out of the shadows and
opening law enforcement’s practices up for critique.23 Both
departments’ policies mandate that their respective federal
law enforcement agents obtain search warrants prior to using
cell-site simulators.24 Notably, however, neither department
21. See Kristi Winner, Note, From Historical Cell-Site Location
Information to IMSI-Catchers: Why Triggerfish Devices Do Not Trigger
Fourth Amendment Protection, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243, 254–55 (2017)
(positing that the nondisclosure agreements between Harris Corporation, the
largest manufacturer of cell-site simulators, and law enforcement agencies
are the primary reason for the shroud of secrecy surrounding cell-site
simulators).
22. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces
Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, at 1 (Sept. 3, 2015), https://
perma.cc/L4WF-Z2P9 (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (emphasizing the importance
of cell-site simulator technology to law enforcement and explaining that, to
enhance privacy protections, law enforcement must obtain a search warrant
supported by probable cause before using a cell-site simulator) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Memorandum from Dep’t of
Homeland Security on Dep’t Policy Regarding the Use of Cell-Site Simulator
Technology, at 4 (Oct. 19, 2015), https://perma.cc/5RGA-BEXV (PDF)
[hereinafter DHS Policy] (“[A]s a matter of policy, law enforcement
Components must now obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause
and issued pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure . . . .”); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (discussing searches and
seizures).
23. See, e.g., Laura DeGeer, Note, Cell-Site Simulators: A Call for More
Protective Federal Legislation, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. 351, 352 (2016) (arguing
that Congress should draft a bill “enumerating when, how, and by whom a
cell site simulator may be used”); Jenna Jonassen, Note, Stingrays,
Triggerfish, and Hailstorms, Oh My! The Fourth Amendment Implications of
the Increasing Government Use of Cell-Site Simulators, 33 TOURO L. REV.
1123, 1127 (2017) (“[T]his Note attempts to provide an accurate road map of
the various types of information concerning cell-site simulator use and how
its implications on Fourth Amendment rights call for the establishment of a
sufficient probable cause warrant prior to its use.”).
24. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE POLICY
GUIDANCE: USE OF CELL-SITE SIMULATOR TECHNOLOGY 3 (Sept. 3, 2015),
https://perma.cc/5YYW-D7DY (PDF) [hereinafter DOJ Policy] (explaining
that, before using cell-site simulators, “law enforcement agencies must now
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has conceded that law enforcement officers are constitutionally
required to obtain a search warrant before using a cell-site
simulator.25 Many state and local law enforcement agencies
are not governed by similar policies or state laws and therefore
are not required to obtain search warrants before using
cell-site simulators.26 Thus, the constitutionality of law
enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators remains unclear in
many jurisdictions.
B. How Cell-Site Simulators Work
Some familiarity with cell phone technology is necessary
to understand the potential Fourth Amendment issues raised
by cell-site simulators.27 A cell phone is essentially a “two-way
radio with a low-power transmitter that operates in a network
of cell sites.”28 A “cell” is an area of geographic coverage, often
illustrated as a hexagon.29 A “cell site” is the physical location

obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause and issued pursuant to
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure”); DHS Policy, supra note
22, at 2 (explaining that, before using cell-site simulators, “law enforcement
Components must now obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause
and issued pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure”).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 545 (7th Cir. 2016)
(“The Department of Justice announced last September that in the future it
would ordinarily seek a warrant, plus an order under the pen-register
statute . . . before using a cell-site simulator, but it has not conceded that
this is constitutionally required.”).
26. See Winner, supra note 21, at 261 nn.136–41 (listing Colorado,
Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Tennessee, and Wisconsin as
the only states that have enacted statutes that regulate the use of cell-site
simulators, and California, Minnesota, Utah, Virginia, and Washington as
the only states that have enacted statutes explicitly requiring search
warrants to use cell-site simulators); see also Stingray Tracking Devices:
Who’s Got Them?, ACLU (last updated Nov. 2018), https://perma.cc/E8LGAU2J (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (mapping law enforcement’s use of cell-site
simulators at the federal, state, and local levels) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
27. See In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with
Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2005)
(beginning the discussion of prospective cell-site data with an overview of
basic cell phone technology).
28. Id.
29. Id.
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where the radio transceiver and base station controller are
located.30 Cell sites send and receive traffic from cell phones in
their geographic areas to switching offices, which handle the
phone connections and controls for a given region.31 Most
modern cell phones connect with cell sites several times per
minute.32 Cell phones are constantly scanning their
environments for the strongest signal, even when they are not
in use.33 Generally, the strongest cell phone signal comes from
the closest cell site.34
When activated, a cell-site simulator mimics legitimate
cell sites by sending out broadcasts to cell phones in its
vicinity.35 Nearby cell phones then identify the cell-site
simulator as the closest, most attractive cell site in the area,
connecting with the cell-site simulator instead of a legitimate

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. (“The cell phone re-scans every seven seconds or when the
signal strength weakens, regardless of whether a call is placed.”); Carpenter
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018) (explaining that cell phones
connect with their wireless networks even when the owner is not using one of
the cell phone’s features).
33. See id. (“When a cell phone is powered up, it acts as a scanning
radio, searching through a list of control channels for the strongest signal.”).
34. See id. (“Cell phones continuously scan their environment looking
for the best signal, which generally comes from the closest cell site.”).
35. See Orin Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to Cell-Site
Simulators, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/EA8B-Z6C4 (last
visited Feb. 3, 2020) (“The simulators send out broadcasts to phones in the
neighborhood just as a real cell site would.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Cell Site Simulators, A National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers Primer, BERKELEY TECH. & PUB. POL’Y CLINIC
(Apr. 28, 2016), https://perma.cc/MV3F-3VQW (PDF) [hereinafter NACDL
Primer] (providing an overview of how cell-site simulators work and
outlining ways for defense lawyers to challenge the admissibility of evidence
obtained via cell-site simulators); Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://perma.cc/92NJ-44XJ (last visited Feb.
3, 2020) (describing cell-site simulators as “devices that masquerade as
legitimate cell phone towers, tricking phones within a certain radius into
connecting to the device rather than a tower”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); C. Justin Brown & Kasha M. Leese, StingRay Devices
Usher in a New Fourth Amendment Battleground, CHAMPION, June 2015, at
13 (reporting that a cell-site simulator is a device that can “locate the source
of a cellular signal without going through the wireless carrier”).
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cell site.36 Cell phones have no way of distinguishing between
legitimate cell sites and cell-site simulators.37
C. How Law Enforcement Use Cell-Site Simulators
Once a cell-site simulator has connected with a cell phone,
law enforcement officers can identify the direction and signal
strength of that particular cell phone.38 By shifting the location
of the cell-site simulator, an officer can determine the cell
phone’s location more precisely than if she were to triangulate
the cell phone’s signal using its CSLI.39 Due to their relatively
small size, officers can either carry cell-site simulators by hand
or deploy them in vehicles for larger-scale surveillance.40

36. See DOJ Policy, supra note 24, at 2 (“In response to the signals
emitted by the simulator, cellular devices . . . identify the simulator as the
most attractive cell tower in the area and thus transmit signals to the
simulator that identify the device in the same way that they would with a
networked tower.”).
37. See Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret
StingRay’s No Secret Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly over
Cell Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National Security and Consumer
Privacy, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12 (“As a result [of cell phones’ inability to
authenticate cell sites], phones have no way to differentiate between a
legitimate base station owned or operated by the target’s wireless carrier and
a rogue device impersonating a carrier’s base station.”).
38. See Brown & Leese, supra note 35, at 13–14 (summarizing the
additional equipment needed to operate a cell-site simulator, which includes
“an antenna, a device that processes the signals transmitted on cell phone
frequencies, and a laptop computer that analyzes the signals and allows the
agent to configure the incoming information”).
39. See id. at 14 (distinguishing cell-site simulators from cell tower
tracking: “cell site simulators produce extremely precise location
information, in some cases within an accuracy of approximately six feet”).
40. See NACDL Primer, supra note 35, at 1 (describing cell-site
simulators as “portable, briefcase-sized devices, which can fit in small cars,
be carried by hand, and even be deployed on airplanes to facilitate
larger-scale surveillance”); see also Kim Zetter, California Police Used
Stingrays in Planes to Spy on Phones, WIRED (Jan. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc
/MQ8K-GYHB (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (recounting the Anaheim Police
Department’s use of Dirtboxes, or plane-mounted cell-site simulators, to
conduct surveillance above Disneyland) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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Law enforcement officers can also use cell-site simulators
to obtain a cell phone’s identifying information,41 including its
international mobile subscriber number, mobile identification
number, and electronic serial number.42 Once a cell-site
simulator has connected with a cell phone, the cell-site
simulator will obtain the signaling information relating only to
that particular device.43
Depending on the jurisdiction, law enforcement officers
may have access to both passive and active cell-site
simulators.44 Passive cell-site simulators intercept the signals
sent between nearby cell phones and cell sites, but do not
transmit any signals of their own.45 As a result, passive
cell-site simulators “can only detect signals of nearby phones
when those phones are actually transmitting data.”46 Active
cell-site simulators, as the name suggests, directly interact

41. “Identifying information” includes the International Mobile
Equipment Identity (IMEI), a unique number assigned to each handset, and
the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), a unique number
assigned to each SIM card. See NACDL Primer, supra note 35, at 1.
42. See Brown & Leese, supra note 35, at 13 n.9 (“IMSI is the acronym
for ‘[i]nternational mobile subscriber identity,’ which is a cellphone’s unique
identifier.”); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL
PROCEDURES AND CASE LAW FORMS 40 (June 2005), https://perma.cc/2KEU6B5W (PDF) [hereinafter DOJ SURVEILLANCE MANUAL] (explaining that an
MIN is a cell phone’s telephone number, while an ESN is the number
assigned by the cell phone’s manufacturer to the cell phone); see also
Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers, supra note 35 (“Once your cellular
device has connected to a cell-site simulator, the cell-site simulator can
determine your location and read identifying data such as IMSI or ESN
numbers directly from your mobile device.”).
43. See DHS Policy, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining that “[c]ell-site
simulators provide only the relative signal strength and general direction of
the subject cellular device; they do not function as a OPS locator, as they do
not obtain or download any location information from the device or its
applications”).
44. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 37, at 9 (“The technologies that
enable the direct interception of cellular phone calls without the assistance of
a wireless carrier generally fall into two categories: passive and active.”).
45. Id.
46. See id. at 12 (noting that one advantage of passive cell-site
simulators is that they are “far more covert in operation—indeed effectively
invisible”).

992

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 981 (2020)

with the cell phones they are used to surveil.47 An active
cell-site simulator impersonates a cell-site by sending out
broadcasts to phones in its vicinity.48 Thus, active cell-site
simulators can connect with cell phones that are not in use.49
Law enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators is
distinguishable from cell tower tracking, or the use of CSLI to
triangulate a cell phone’s signal.50 However, law enforcement
officers often use cell-site simulators in tandem with CSLI.51
CSLI is the time-stamped record generated by a cell phone
each time it connects with a cell site.52 Wireless carriers collect
and store CSLI for their own business purposes,53 often for
years at a time.54 Law enforcement officers use CSLI to
determine a cell phone’s approximate location, either

47. Id.
48. See Kerr, supra note 35 (“The simulators send out broadcasts to
phones in the neighborhood just as a real cell site would.”).
49. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 37, at 13 (noting that, unlike their
passive counterparts, active cell-site simulators can “rapidly identify and
locate all nearby phones that are turned on, even if they are not transmitting
any data”).
50. See Stephanie Lacambra, Cell Phone Location Tracking or CSLI: A
Guide for Criminal Defense Attorneys, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. 1,
https://perma.cc/WN9C-M7JP (PDF) (discussing ways in which criminal
defense attorneys can challenge the admissibility of cell phone location data).
51. See United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 609 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) (“Using CSLI, DEA agents were able to determine that the target cell
phone was located in the general vicinity of ‘the Washington Heights area by
177th and Broadway.’” (citation omitted)).
52. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211–12 (2018)
(explaining that cell phones function by continuously connecting to a set of
radio antennas, or cell sites, and that each time a cell phone connects to a
cell site, it generates a time-stamped record); Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at
608–09 (describing CSLI as “a record of non-content-based location
information from the service provider derived from ‘pings’ sent to cell sites by
a target cell phone”).
53. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (listing the following business
purposes for retaining CSLI: finding weak spots in networks, applying
“roaming” charges, and selling aggregated location records to data brokers).
54. See Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter
Chronicle: A Near Perfect Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 213 (2018)
(discussing telecom companies’ move toward retaining CSLI for periods of a
year or more as they realized the “potential for huge profits by monetizing
such location data”).
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historically55 or in real-time.56 The precision of the
determination depends on the number of cell sites in the area
and can range from “a few blocks to several square miles.”57
D. Critiques of Law Enforcement’s Use of Cell-Site Simulators
Privacy advocates such as the Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF) and the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) have argued that law enforcement’s use of cell-site
simulators raises a number of privacy concerns.58 One such
argument is that when law enforcement use a cell-site
simulator to ascertain the location of a target cell phone, they
invade the target cell phone user’s expectations of privacy in
her physical location and thus violate the Fourth

55. See NACDL Primer, supra note 35, at 1 n.6 (“Call detail records
include the following information in relation to a phone call: time, duration,
historical cell phone location information, completion status, source number,
and destination number.”); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (describing
how, by using Carpenter’s CSLI, an FBI agent was able to produce a map
retroactively placing Carpenter’s cell phone near the locations of four
robberies).
56. See Lacambra, supra note 50, at 1 (noting that cell phone companies
also store prospective data, which allows law enforcement officers to track a
cell phone’s movements in real-time); NACDL Primer, supra note 35, at 1
(“Prospective location information, on the other hand, helps law enforcement
trace the current whereabouts of a suspect, which can lead to arrest.”);
United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 776 (6th Cir. 2012) (describing law
enforcement’s use of prospective CSLI to apprehend a suspect).
57. See NACDL Primer, supra note 35, at 1 n.2; see also Carpenter, 138
S. Ct. at 2211–12 (2018) (observing that wireless carriers’ installation of
more cell sites has led to increasingly compact coverage areas in urban
areas).
58. See, e.g., Cell Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers, supra note 35
(maintaining that cell-site simulators disrupt cell phone communications);
Brown & Leese, supra note 35, at 15 (arguing that the “invasive action” law
enforcement officers engage in when they use cell-site simulators “is akin to
a police officer scrolling through a phone’s records”); Memorandum from the
Am. Civil Liberties Union on Fed. Recommendations on the Use of Cell-Site
Simulators, at 1, https://perma.cc/25M8-AYQG (PDF) (“Policies governing
the use of these devices fail to comply with the Fourth Amendment, raise
significant civil liberties and privacy concerns, and undermine effective
judicial and Congressional oversight.”).
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Amendment.59 Privacy advocates have also raised concerns
regarding cell-site simulators’ ability to connect with large
swaths of cell phone users at any given time,60 arguing that
such use of cell-site simulators allows law enforcement to
engage in dragnet surveillance.61 This Note only seeks to
address the first method of surveillance—law enforcement’s
use of cell-site simulators to track a target cell phone user.
II. The Fourth Amendment Governs Law Enforcement’s Use of
Cell-Site Simulators
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures”62 and “to secure
the ‘privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’”63 The terms
59. See How to Challenge the Use of Cell-Site Simulators, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND., https://perma.cc/X98N-QR9D (last visited Feb. 3, 2020)
(providing examples of arguments defense attorneys can use in challenging
law enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Letter from Nathan Freed Wilder, Am. Civil Liberties
Union, to John Brooks, Chief of Police, Sunrise, Florida (Feb. 28, 2014),
https://perma.cc/P7SV-KBYY (PDF) [hereinafter ACLU Letter] (“And using a
cell site simulator to ascertain the location of a specific cell phone can reveal
that it is in a constitutionally protected place, such as a home, that has
traditionally been immune from search unless law enforcement agents
obtain a warrant based on probable cause.”).
60. See Zetter, supra note 40, at 2 (“Stingrays don’t just pick up the IDs
of targeted devices, however. Every phone within range will contact the
system, revealing their ID.”).
61. See Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers, supra note 35 (arguing
cell-site simulators facilitate “indiscriminate, dragnet searches” of “phones
located in traditionally protected private spaces, such as homes and doctors’
offices”); Freiwald & Smith, supra note 54, at 229 (arguing that “this is also
an easy case to predict” because the use of cell-site simulators “raises the
specter of an illegal general warrant”); ACLU Letter, supra note 59
(“Collecting unique identifiers of all phones in a particular location
inherently collects location data on many innocent people.”).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
63. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018)
(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)); see also Camara v.
Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (describing the basic purpose of
the Fourth Amendment as “safeguard[ing] the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by the government”); United States
v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (noting that one of the Framers’ central
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“search” and “seizure” are terms of limitation.64 As such, “[l]aw
enforcement practices are not required by the Fourth
Amendment to be reasonable unless they are either ‘searches’
or ‘seizures.’”65 To qualify as a search or seizure, law
enforcement practices must “bear the requisite relationship to
‘persons, houses, papers, and effects.’”66 Accordingly, in
examining the constitutionality of cell-site simulators, a
threshold question that must be answered is whether law
enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator is a search or seizure
that infringes on individuals’ rights to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects.67
A. Law Enforcement’s Use of a Cell-Site Simulator Is Not a
Fourth Amendment Seizure
A “‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some
meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory
interests in that property.”68 Case law regarding law
enforcement’s use of electronic tracking devices is particularly
aims in drafting the Fourth Amendment was “to place obstacles in the way of
a too permeating police power”).
64. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.1 (5th ed. 2019) (citing Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 356 (1974)).
65. Id.
66. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 356 (1974); see also Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a
Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 540 (2005) (describing the need for
“some sort of legitimate relationship between the property searched and the
defendant . . . to generate Fourth Amendment rights” where law enforcement
searches electronically stored evidence).
67. See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (holding
that the Fourth Amendment only limits governmental action and does not
reach private searches or seizures).
68. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (explaining
that the definition of seizure of property follows from the Supreme Court’s
oft-repeated definition of the seizure of a person as “meaningful interference,
however brief, with an individual’s freedom of movement” (citing Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981))); Mark Taticchi, Note, Redefining
Possessory Interests: Perfect Copies of Information as Fourth Amendment
Seizures, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 476, 477 (2010) (“Courts generally interpret
possessory interest to mean physical possession, even when the property
allegedly seized is intangible, like information.”).
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helpful in determining whether law enforcement seize a cell
phone user’s location information when a targeted cell phone
connects to a cell-site simulator. In United States v. Karo,69 the
Supreme Court addressed “whether installation of a beeper in
a container of chemicals with the consent of the original owner
constitute[d] a search or seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment when the container is delivered to a buyer
having no knowledge of the presence of the beeper.”70 In Karo,
DEA agents had obtained a court order authorizing the
installation and monitoring of a beeper in one of the cans of
ether ordered by James Karo.71 After substituting a can
containing a beeper for one of the cans in Karo’s shipment, the
agents were able to track Karo to his residence, to a storage
facility, and eventually, to an accomplice’s residence.72 The
Court held that the actual placement of the beeper did not
constitute a seizure73 because the beeper’s placement did not
interfere with Karo’s possessory interest in the can of ether in
a “meaningful way.”74 Under the Karo Court’s reasoning,
therefore, a “technical” and “physical” trespass does not
constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure if the trespass does
not interfere with an individual’s possessory interest in a
meaningful way.75
Law enforcement do not seize a target user’s cell phone in
violation of the Fourth Amendment when they deploy a
cell-site simulator. Although cell-site simulators may interfere
69. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
70. Id. at 707.
71. Id. at 708.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 713 (“We conclude that no Fourth Amendment interest of
Karo or of any other respondent was infringed by the installation of the
beeper. Rather, any impairment of their privacy interests that may have
occurred was occasioned by the monitoring of the beeper.”).
74. See id. at 712 (relying on the traditional definition of “seizure” as
some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in the
seized property to support the holding that no Fourth Amendment seizure
took place).
75. See id. at 713 (cautioning that “if the presence of a beeper in the can
constituted a seizure merely because of its occupation of space, it would
follow that the presence of any object, regardless of its nature, would violate
the Fourth Amendment”).
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“‘with the functioning’ of, or ‘coopt[ing]’ of [the] phone
involved,”76 such interference is “akin to the interruptions or
intrusions [that] . . . are permissible when police officers
execute a search incident to arrest that turns up a cell
phone.”77 The cell-site simulator does not, by “[h]old[ing] on to
[a cell phone] for a minute,” meaningfully interfere with the
cell phone user’s possessory interest.78 Thus, under Karo, law
enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator does not amount to a
Fourth Amendment seizure.
Writing in dissent in Karo, Justice Stevens argued that
“the surreptitious use of a radio transmitter . . . on an
individual’s personal property is both a seizure and a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”79 Justice
Stevens relied on a property owner’s right to exclude80 in
concluding that “[w]hen the Government attaches an electronic
monitoring device to that property, it infringes that
exclusionary right; in a fundamental sense it has converted the
property to its own use.”81 According to Justice Stevens, any
interference with an individual’s possessory rights, which
include the right to exclude, is a meaningful interference:
“[T]he character of the property is profoundly different when
infected with an electronic bug than when it is entirely germ
free.”82
76. This interference includes “having . . . calls dropped.” Jones v.
United States, 168 A.3d 703, 743 n.39 (D.C. Ct. App. 2017).
77. Id. (citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386–89 (2014)). In the
search incident to a lawful arrest context, police officers are “free to examine
the physical aspects of [the] phone,” may “turn the phone off or remove its
battery,” or may “leave a phone powered on and place it in an enclosure that
isolates the phone from radio waves.” Id.
78. Id. at 743.
79. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 728 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (writing to
express his belief that “the Fourth Amendment’s reach is somewhat broader
than that which is explicitly acknowledged by the Court”).
80. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“An essential element of individual property is the
legal right to exclude others from it.”); RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 7 (AM. LAW
INST. 1936) (“A possessory interest in land exists in a person who has . . . an
intent so to exercise such control as to exclude other members of society in
general from any present occupation of the land.”).
81. Karo, 468 U.S. at 728.
82. Id. at 729.
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Arguably, under Justice Stevens’s rationale, the use of a
cell-site simulator could be considered a seizure of the target
user’s cell phone because the cell-site simulator interferes with
the user’s most fundamental possessory rights.83 If a cell-site
simulator effectively turns an individual’s cell phone into a
tracking device,84 the cell phone owner’s property has been
converted to the government’s use, thus violating the cell
phone owner’s right to exclude.85 Despite the potential viability
of Justice Stevens’s dissent in Karo, it was not adopted in any
of the lower court decisions that have addressed the
constitutionality of cell-site simulators.86
B. Law Enforcement’s Use of a Cell-Site Simulator May Be a
Fourth Amendment Search
Like the term “seizure,” “search” is a term of art in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.87 Since the Supreme Court’s
83. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77
NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (arguing that the right to exclude is “more than
just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of property—it is the sine qua
non” (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979))).
84. See United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 611 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) (holding that, “[a]bsent a search warrant, the Government may not
turn a citizen’s cell phone into a tracking device”).
85. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 728 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“When the Government attaches an electronic monitoring device
to that property, it infringes that exclusionary right; in a fundamental sense
it has converted the property to its own use.”); Evers v. Cty. of Custer, 745
F.2d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984) (“A property owner’s right to exclude others
is universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right.”
(citation omitted)).
86. See Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 608 (examining whether Lambis’s
motion to suppress evidence of “narcotics and drug paraphernalia recovered
by law enforcement agents in connection with a search of his apartment”
should be granted on the grounds that law enforcement’s use of a cell-site
simulator constituted a Fourth Amendment search); State v. Andrews, 134
A.3d 324, 326 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (noting that the case presented “a
Fourth Amendment issue of first impression in this State: whether a cell
phone—a piece of technology so ubiquitous as to be on the person of
practically every citizen—may be transformed into a real-time tracking
device by the government without a warrant”).
87. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, ITS HISTORY AND
INTERPRETATION 420 (3d ed. 2017) (noting that while the Supreme Court has
occasionally consulted the dictionary and similar sources for their definitions
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decision in Katz v. United States,88 both “[e]xpectations of
privacy and property interests govern the analysis of Fourth
Amendment search . . . claims.”89 Although the Supreme Court
has predominantly relied on the reasonable expectation of
privacy test since deciding Katz in 1967,90 the physical
trespass test has regained viability91 in the wake of the Court’s
decision in United States v. Jones.92 Accordingly, whether law
enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators interferes with
individuals’ rights to be secure in their “persons, houses,
papers, and effects”93 must be analyzed under both the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test94 and the physical
trespass test.95
of “search,” it has not formally adopted those definitions); LAFAVE, supra
note 64, § 2.1(a)
The meaning of the word “searches,” the matter of primary
concern in this Chapter, is not as easily captured within any
verbal formulation. Under the traditional approach, the term
“search” is said to imply some exploratory investigation, or an
invasion and quest, a looking for or seeking out. The quest may be
secret, intrusive, or accomplished by force, and it has been held
that a search implies some sort of force, either actual or
constructive, much or little.
88. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
89. United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77, 82 (1993) (per curiam).
90. See, e.g., CLANCY, supra note 87, at 118 (noting that Justice Harlan’s
concurring opinion in Katz has endured “as the predominant measure for the
scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protections”).
91. See id. at 103–04 (emphasizing the Supreme Court’s recognition
that the Fourth Amendment protects property interests as well as possessory
and liberty interests and that the property-based analysis has regained
viability since Katz); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 418 (2012)
(concluding that the government’s placement of a GPS tracking device on
Jones’s vehicle “supplie[d] a narrower basis for decision” that allowed the
Court to decide the case under the physical trespass test).
92. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
94. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (proposing that a reasonable expectation of privacy requires a
person “exhibit[] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy [that] society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”).
95. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (explaining that the text of the
Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection to property); Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (limiting an individual’s protected
interest under the Fourth Amendment to “material things,” such that
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1. The Physical Trespass Test

Fourth Amendment protections were originally grounded
in common law property concepts.96 As a product of the
eighteenth century’s strong concern for protection of property
rights against arbitrary and general government searches,97
courts have often viewed the Fourth Amendment’s historical
context as a primary source for understanding the Amendment
itself.98 Under the physical trespass test, which asks whether
the government “physically occupied private property for the
purpose of obtaining information,”99 the Fourth Amendment’s
protections are effectively limited to the physical aspects of
“persons, houses, papers, and effects.”100
Decided in 2012, United States v. Jones signaled a revival
of the physical trespass test and the end of the Katz-dominated
era of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Relying on the physical
trespass test, the Jones Court held that “the Government’s
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of
that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitute[d] a
‘search.’”101 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia relied on

conversations were not protected against unreasonable searches under the
Fourth Amendment because they were not included in the list of tangible
objects specified in the text of the Fourth Amendment), overruled by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (concluding that “the underpinnings of
Olmstead . . . have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the
‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as
controlling”).
96. See CLANCY, supra note 87, at 9 (describing the Supreme Court’s use
of property concepts to limit the protections of the Amendment to “persons,
places, houses, and effects,” thus dividing the world into areas that were
constitutionally protected and those that were not).
97. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a ‘Search’ Within the Meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) (pointing out that it was the
Founders’ reaction to the English and colonial search and seizure abuses
that culminated in the adoption of the Fourth Amendment).
98. See CLANCY, supra note 87, at 104–05 (clarifying the justification for
the Framers’ inclusion of the notion that “a man’s house is his castle” in the
Fourth Amendment).
99. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
101. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
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the Fourth Amendment’s “close connection to property.”102
Justice Scalia emphasized that an individual’s protected
interests under the Fourth Amendment do not rise or fall with
the Katz formulation because, in determining whether a search
has taken place, “[a]t bottom, [the Court] must ‘assure[]
preservation of that degree of privacy against government
intrusion that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted.’”103 Accordingly, the Jones Court reaffirmed the
proposition that the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
test is an addition to, rather than replacement for, the common
law trespassory test.104
In their separate dissents in Carpenter v. United States,
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch signaled a
willingness to apply the physical trespass test to determine
whether a review of historical CSLI constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search.105 The Justices’ underlying rationales for
utilizing the physical trespass test were, however, based
largely on the third-party doctrine106 and thus are inapplicable
to the location information obtained via cell-site simulators.
102. See id. at 405 (“The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close
connection to property, since otherwise it would have referred simply to ‘the
right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures’;
the phrase ‘in their persons, houses, papers, and effects’ would have been
superfluous.”).
103. Id. at 406 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
104. See, e.g., Soldal v. Cook Co., 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992) (explaining that
the Fourth Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of
governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have
nothing to do with privacy at all).
105. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223–24 (2018)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (advocating for “[a]dherence to this Court’s
longstanding precedents and analytic framework,” specifically, to the
“property-based concepts that have long grounded the analytic framework
that pertains in [Fourth Amendment] cases”); id. at 2235 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that “[t]his case should turn not on ‘whether’ a search
occurred,” but on “whose property was searched”); id. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (advocating in favor of a traditional property-based approach in
which the Court need only ask whether “a house, paper or effect is yours
under law”).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976)
(concluding that Miller could not assert ownership or possession over
subpoenaed bank records because they were the bank’s business records and
not his “private papers”).
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Unlike the location information obtained via cell-site
simulators, CSLI is physical data that is stored by third-party
wireless carriers.107 The third-party doctrine does not apply to
the location information obtained by cell-site simulators
because, in using a cell-site simulator, law enforcement officers
“cut[] out the middleman and obtain[] the information directly
from the targeted cell phone.”108 When there is no third party,
the third-party doctrine is inapplicable.109 While it is true that
“Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz
formulation,” because cell-site simulators do not generate
physical records stored by third-parties, their use should be
analyzed under the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
test.110
2. The Katz Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
Under the two-pronged Katz test, in order to assert an
interest protected under the Fourth Amendment, a person
must exhibit (1) an actual, subjective expectation of privacy
that (2) society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.111 If

107. See Robinson Meyer, This Very Common Cellphone Surveillance
Still Doesn’t Require a Warrant, ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc
/R9VT-D7HN (last visited Feb. 3, 2020)
Right now, CSLI comes in three flavors. The first is “real-time,”
where police work with a cell provider to access location data
immediately after it’s created. This usually does require a
warrant. The second is a “tower dump,” when authorities ask for
all the phones that have communicated with a certain tower
during a period of time. There’s not a lot of law about how tower
dumps work, but as of September of last year cops rarely sought a
warrant for them. The third is historical CSLI, where law
enforcement requests a backlog of location data created by a
certain phone.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
108. United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
109. See id. (“Without a third party, the third-party doctrine is
inapplicable.”).
110. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012).
111. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (proposing that a reasonable expectation of privacy requires a
person “exhibit[] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and “the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”).
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either prong is missing, then there is no protected interest, and
the Fourth Amendment does not apply.112 The Katz majority,
in concluding that law enforcement violated Katz’s reasonable
expectation of privacy by placing a recording device outside the
public phone booth from which Katz had placed his calls,
explained that the Fourth Amendment protects people and not
places.113 After Katz, therefore, a Fourth Amendment analysis
no longer exclusively “turn[s] upon the presence or absence of a
physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”114
The first prong of the Katz test requires an individual to
have exhibited “an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy.”115 The first prong looks at whether an individual, by
her conduct, has shown that she “seeks to preserve [something]
as private.”116 Justice Harlan clarified that analysis under
Katz “must . . . transcend the search for subjective
expectations,” because “[o]ur expectations, and the risks we
assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into

112. See CLANCY, supra note 87, at 118 (contrasting Justice Harlan’s
two-part test with the Katz’s majority opinion, which spoke in terms of
unadorned privacy, without modification by any inquiry into subjectivity or
reasonableness); see also, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281
(1983) (holding that the government’s use of a beeper to monitor defendant
Petschen’s movements was not a Fourth Amendment search because a
“person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another”).
113. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 (“[T]his effort to decide whether or not a
given ‘area,’ viewed in the abstract, is ‘constitutionally protected’ deflects
attention from the problem presented by this case. For the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.”).
114. See id. at 353 (“[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment
protects people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and
seizures it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn
upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure.”).
115. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 351 (majority opinion). Professor Wayne LaFave provides a
helpful example of a defendant whose expectation of privacy could not be
considered reasonable: “a person openly engaged in criminal conduct in
Times Square at high noon, who police observed engaging in criminal
conduct.” LAFAVE, supra note 64, at § 2.1(c).
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rules the customs and values of the past and present.”117 While
the Supreme Court continues to use the “actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy” formulation, the Court has cautioned
that in some situations it “provide[s] an inadequate index of
Fourth Amendment protection.”118 Arguably, therefore, greater
emphasis should be placed on the Katz test’s second prong,
which requires an individual’s expectation of privacy be one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.119 The
following cases explore the Court’s applications of the Katz test
to law enforcement’s use of various electronic surveillance
techniques.
3. Supreme Court Case Law Applying the Katz Test
a. United States v. Knotts
In United States v. Knotts,120 narcotics officers were
investigating defendants Darryl Petschen and Tristan
Armstrong for the manufacturing of illegal drugs.121 The
officers discovered that Armstrong had been purchasing large
quantities of chloroform, a solvent used to manufacture drugs,
and delivering the chloroform to Petschen.122 With the
117. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
118. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (noting that the
individual’s expectation of privacy must also be justifiable when viewed
objectively).
119. See Amsterdam, supra note 66, at 384
An actual, subjective expectation of privacy . . . can neither add to,
nor can its absence detract from, an individual’s claim to [F]ourth
[A]mendment protection. If it could, the government could
diminish each person’s subjective expectation of privacy merely by
announcing half-hourly on television that . . . we were all
forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic
surveillance.
120. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
121. See id. at 278 (describing the process by which the 3M Company, a
chemical manufacturing company, notified local law enforcement that one of
its former employees had been stealing chemicals used to manufacture
illegal drugs).
122. See id. (“Visual surveillance of Armstrong revealed that after
leaving the employ of 3M Company, he had been purchasing similar
chemicals from the Hawkins Chemical Company in Minneapolis.”).
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chemical manufacturing company’s permission, the officers
installed a beeper inside a container of chloroform, which the
company later sold to Armstrong.123 Using the beeper, the
officers tracked the container to Leroy Knotts’s cabin in rural
Wisconsin, where they discovered a clandestine drug
operation.124 Knotts and Petschen moved to suppress the
evidence obtained as a result of the officers’ warrantless
installation and monitoring of the beeper.125 Their motion was
denied by the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota.126 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence obtained
from the search of Knotts’s cabin was admissible against
Petschen, but not against Knotts.127 Knotts appealed, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.128
The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether
the officers’ “use of a beeper violated [Knotts’s] rights secured
by the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.”129 The Court ultimately held that “[a] person
travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one
place to another.”130 In so holding, the Court emphasized that
by driving along public thoroughfares, Petschen “voluntarily
123. See id. (describing the agreement under which the Hawkins
Chemical Company agreed to sell Armstrong a gallon of chloroform with a
beeper inside it).
124. After crossing into Wisconsin, Petschen began making evasive
maneuvers and the pursuing agents were forced to end their visual
surveillance. The officers lost the beeper’s signal for almost an hour. The
officers were only able to regain the signal with help from a monitoring
device located in a helicopter. Id. at 278.
125. Id.
126. See id. (denying the motion to suppress and convicting Knotts for
conspiring to manufacture controlled substances).
127. See United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515, 518 (8th Cir. 1981)
(explaining that Knotts, as the resident and owner of the property, had a
reasonable, legitimate expectation of privacy in the cans of chloroform, but
that Petschen’s expectation of privacy was not one society would be prepared
to recognize as reasonable).
128. United States v. Knotts, 457 U.S. 1131 (1982).
129. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983).
130. Id. at 281.
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conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was
travelling
over
particular
roads
in
a
particular
direction . . . and the fact of his final destination when he
exited from public roads onto private property.”131 The Court
further explained that because the officers could have visually
surveilled Petschen driving along public roads and onto
Knotts’s property, “scientific enhancement of this sort raise[d]
no constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not
also raise.”132
The Court’s Knotts decision stands for three propositions,
all of which are potentially relevant to an analysis of the
Fourth Amendment issues raised by law enforcement’s use of
cell-site simulators. First, the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit law enforcement officers from augmenting and
enhancing their senses by using technology.133 Second, a
landowner does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the visual observations of an automobile arriving on his
private premises after leaving a public highway.134 Third, a
homeowner does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the movements of objects outside his home in the “open
fields.”135

131. Id. at 281–82.
132. Id. at 285.
133. See id. at 282 (“Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the
police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth
with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this
case.”); see also United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (holding that
the use of a “searchlight” is “comparable to the use of a marine glass or a
field glass” and “is not prohibited by the Constitution”).
134. See id. (“[N]o such expectation of privacy extended to the visual
observation of Petschen’s automobile arriving on his premises after leaving a
public highway . . . .”).
135. See id. (“[N]o such expectation of privacy extended to
the . . . movements of objects such as the drum of chloroform outside the
cabin in the ‘open fields.’”); see also Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59
(1924) (“[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the
people in their ‘persons, houses, papers and effects,’ is not extended to the
open fields.”).
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b. United States v. Karo
Building off of questions left unresolved by its decision in
Knotts,136 in United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court
addressed whether the “monitoring of a beeper in a private
residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, violates
the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable
interest in the privacy of the residence.”137 After receiving a tip
that James Karo had ordered fifty gallons of ether, a compound
often used in the manufacture of illegal drugs, DEA agents
placed a beeper in one of the cans eventually sold to Karo.138
Using the beeper, DEA agents were able to track the can of
ether as it was moved from Karo’s own residence to other
private residences.139
The Court applied the Katz test to the DEA agents’
monitoring of the beeper: “[P]rivate residences are places in
which the individual normally expects privacy free of
governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that
expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize
as justifiable.”140 The Court went on to hold that the agents’
monitoring of the beeper was a Fourth Amendment search.141
In so holding, the Court relied on the “general rule that a
search of a house should be conducted pursuant to a

136. In Knotts, the record did not show that law enforcement had been
monitoring the beeper while the can of chloroform was inside Knotts’s cabin.
Thus, the Court “had no occasion to consider whether a constitutional
violation would have occurred had the fact been otherwise.” United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
137. Id.
138. See id. at 708 (explaining that ether is used to extract cocaine from
clothing).
139. See id. (describing the can’s movements from Karo’s residence to
Horton’s residence, from Horton’s residence to his father’s residence, and
finally, from Horton’s father’s residence to a commercial storage facility).
140. Id. at 714.
141. See id.
This case thus presents the question whether the monitoring of a
beeper in a private residence, a location not open to visual
surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who
have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence. Contrary
to the submission of the United States, we think that it does.
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warrant.”142 The Court distinguished Karo from Knotts on the
grounds that no constitutionally protected area was implicated
by the law enforcement officers’ surveillance in Knotts,
whereas the beeper surveillance in Karo allowed law
enforcement to monitor the can of ether inside Karo’s
residence.143 Unlike the surveillance information obtained in
Knotts, the beeper monitoring in Karo “reveal[ed] a critical fact
about the interior of the premises that the Government [was]
extremely interested in knowing and that it could not have
otherwise obtained without a warrant.”144
Taken together, the Court’s decisions in Knotts and Karo
indicate that law enforcement’s warrantless use of an
electronic beeper to monitor an individual’s movements is not a
search if the monitoring reveals information that was
“voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look.”145 If,
however, law enforcement’s warrantless monitoring infringes
on a constitutionally protected area, such as the home, then
law enforcement have engaged in a Fourth Amendment
search.146
c. Kyllo v. United States
In Kyllo v. United States, DEA agents directed a thermal
imager147 at the side of Danny Kyllo’s residence in order to

142. Id. at 718.
143. See id. at 715 (emphasizing that by monitoring the beeper, the
agents knew that the can was inside Karo’s residence, something they could
not have verified visually).
144. Id.
145. See id. (“The information obtained in Knotts was ‘voluntarily
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look’; here, as we have said, the
monitoring indicated that the beeper was inside the house, a fact that could
not have been visually verified.” (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276, 281 (1983))).
146. See Freiwald & Smith, supra note 54, at 207 (“Knotts and Karo
brought needed clarity . . . [a] dividing line was drawn between public and
private space—tracking a vehicle on a public highway was not a search, but
monitoring a device within the home or other constitutionally protected
space was subject to Fourth Amendment constraints.”).
147. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001) (describing a
thermal imager as a device that converts radiation into images based on
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ascertain whether Kyllo was growing marijuana in his
home.148 Scans from the thermal imager showed that the roof
over Kyllo’s garage was “relatively hot compared to the rest of
the home and substantially warmer than neighboring homes in
the triplex.”149 The agents concluded that Kyllo was using
halide lights to grow marijuana.150 Based in part on the
thermal imager’s scans, the agents were able to obtain a
warrant to search Kyllo’s home.151 The agents’ search revealed
an indoor growing operation of more than one hundred
marijuana plants.152 Kyllo moved to suppress all evidence
obtained as a result of the agents’ search.153
The issue for the Supreme Court’s consideration was
whether the DEA agents’ use of a thermal imager directed at a
private home from a public street constituted a Fourth
Amendment search.154 The Court held that the information
obtained via the thermal imager was the product of a search.155
Specifically, the agents engaged in a search when they
obtained “by sense-enhancing technology . . . information
regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise
have been obtained without physical intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area.”156
relative degrees of warmth: “black is cool, white is hot, shades of gray
connote relative differences”).
148. See id. at 29 (“Agent William Elliott of the United States
Department of the Interior came to suspect that marijuana was being grown
in the home belonging to . . . Danny Kyllo.”).
149. Id. at 30.
150. Id.
151. See id. (noting that the magistrate judge also relied on tips from
informants and Kyllo’s utility bills in granting the requested search
warrant).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 33 (emphasizing that the case involved more than
“naked-eye” surveillance of a home).
155. See id. at 40 (“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is
not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant.”).
156. Id. at 34.
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In so holding, the Kyllo Court expressed its concern
regarding the effects advances in technology have had and
would continue to have on individuals’ expectations of
privacy.157 One of the questions the Court sought to answer
was, given the circularity of the Katz test,158 “what limits there
are upon [the] power of technology to shrink the realm of
guaranteed privacy.”159 According to the Court, the answer, at
least with regard to the interior of the home, lay in a “ready
criterion”: protection of the interior of the home has “roots deep
within the common law” and has been “acknowledged to be
reasonable.”160 The Court concluded that because the thermal
imager revealed information regarding the interior of Kyllo’s
home that “could not otherwise have been obtained without
physical intrusion,”161 the use of the thermal imager
constituted a search.162
d. United States v. Jones
In United States v. Jones, FBI agents were investigating
Antoine Jones’s suspected involvement in a large-scale drug
trafficking organization.163 In the thirty years between the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Knotts and Karo and its decision
in Jones, surveillance technology has made significant
157. See id. at 33–34 (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of
privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely
unaffected by the advance of technology.”).
158. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by
the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 188 (1979) (“And it is circular to
say that there is no invasion of privacy unless the individual whose privacy
is invaded had a reasonable expectation of privacy; whether he will or will
not have such an expectation will depend on what the legal rule is.”).
159. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See id. (acknowledging critiques of the Katz test but noting that
withdrawing protection of the expectation of privacy an individual has in his
home in this case would effectively “permit police technology to erode the
privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment”).
163. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012) (“In 2004
respondent Antoine Jones, owner and operator of a nightclub in the District
of Columbia, came under suspicion of trafficking in narcotics and was made
the target of an investigation . . . .”).
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advances. Where the law enforcement officers in Knotts and
Karo relied on electronic beepers to monitor their suspects,
FBI agents were able to track Jones for twenty-eight straight
days after they affixed a GPS tracking device to his vehicle.164
Although the Jones Court was faced with an issue raised by
more sophisticated surveillance technology, it relied on the
traditional, physical trespass test in holding that the FBI
agents’ placement and subsequent monitoring of the GPS
tracking device on Jones’s vehicle constituted a search.165
Justice Sotomayor, writing in concurrence, emphasized
that although she agreed with the majority’s trespass
analysis,166 surveillance cases like the one at issue should be
analyzed under the Katz test because “physical intrusion is
now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance.”167 In support
of her assertion, Justice Sotomayor called attention to the
issues raised by GPS monitoring, including the “precise,
comprehensive record” it generates, the detail regarding an
individual’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations” it reveals, and the ease with which it can
be carried out.168 Justice Sotomayor urged that the GPS
device’s capabilities be taken into account when “considering a
reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s
public movements.”169 According to Justice Sotomayor, in
examining whether GPS monitoring constitutes a search,
courts should consider “whether people reasonably expect that
their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner
that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will,
their political and religious beliefs, [and] sexual habits.”170
164. Id. at 403.
165. See id. at 404 (“We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS
device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”).
166. See id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“By contrast, the trespassory
test applied in the majority’s opinion reflects an irreducible constitutional
minimum: When the Government physically invades personal property to
gather information, a search occurs.”).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 415–16.
169. Id. at 416.
170. Id.
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Like Justice Sotomayor, Justice Alito argued in favor of a
Katz analysis to determine whether the FBI agents had
engaged in a search.171 Justice Alito placed particular
emphasis on the “lengthy monitoring that occurred in this
case,”172 noting that relatively short-term monitoring of a
person’s movements in public does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.173 Justice Alito was most concerned with the ease
and detail with which the FBI agents were able to track Jones:
“[F]or four weeks, law enforcement agents tracked every
movement that respondent made in the vehicle he was
driving.”174 Although he was unwilling to “identify with
precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became
a search,” Justice Alito concluded that the “line was surely
crossed before the 4-week mark.”175 Justice Alito proposed
that, in future cases, courts ask “whether the use of GPS
tracking in a particular case involve[s] a degree of intrusion
that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”176
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan joined in
Justice Alito’s concurrence. Thus, according to five Justices,
because GPS monitoring tracks “every movement” an
individual makes, “longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy.”177
e. Carpenter v. United States
In Carpenter v. United States, FBI agents obtained 127
days’ worth of defendant Timothy Carpenter’s CSLI during
171. See id. at 419 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing the Court should have
“analyze[d] the question presented in this case by asking whether
respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated”).
172. Id. at 431.
173. Id. at 430.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see
also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (2018) (citing to the
two concurrences in Jones to support the proposition that longer term GPS
monitoring “impinges on expectations of privacy”—regardless of whether
those movements were disclosed to the public at large).
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their investigation into a string of robberies.178 After the
prosecution identified Carpenter as one of the accomplices who
had participated in the heists,179 a magistrate judge ordered
MetroPCS and Sprint to “disclose ‘cell/site sector [information]
for [Carpenter’s] telephone[] at call origination and at call
termination for incoming and outgoing calls’ during the
four-month period when the string of robberies occurred.”180
Using Carpenter’s CSLI, the prosecution was able to
retroactively place Carpenter’s cell phone near the location of
the robberies at the date and time each robbery took place.181
At trial, Carpenter moved to suppress the CSLI.182 The District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Carpenter’s
motion,183 and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.184 Carpenter then
appealed to the Supreme Court.185
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding
that the location information obtained from Carpenter’s
wireless carriers was the product of a search, and that law
enforcement must generally obtain a warrant supported by
probable cause before obtaining CSLI.186 The Court applied the
178. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018)
(describing as “ironic” the string of robberies of Radio Shack and T-Mobile
stores in Michigan and Ohio).
179. Id.
180. Id. (citation omitted).
181. See id. at 2213 (explaining the FBI agent’s process of using
Carpenter’s CSLI to generate maps placing Carpenter’s cell phone near four
of the charged robberies).
182. See id. at 2212 (arguing that the government’s seizure of
Carpenter’s CSLI records violated his Fourth Amendment rights because
they had been obtained without a warrant supported by probable cause).
183. See United States v. Carpenter, No. 12–20218, 2013 WL 6385838, at
*6 (E.D. Mich., Dec. 6, 2013) (denying Carpenter’s motion to suppress his
CSLI and his motion seeking to preclude the expert testimony of the FBI
special agent who generated the maps placing Carpenter’s cell phone near
the sites of the robberies).
184. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016).
185. See Carpenter v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017) (granting
certiorari).
186. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 (“Having found that the
acquisition of Carpenter’s CSLI was a search, we also conclude that the
Government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause
before acquiring such records.”).
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Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, noting that CSLI
implicates an individual’s expectation of privacy in both his
“physical location and movements” and “in information
voluntarily turned over to third parties.”187 The Court held
that Carpenter “maintain[ed] a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured
through CSLI,”188 and that law enforcement’s access of seven
days’ worth of Carpenter’s CSLI constituted a Fourth
Amendment search.189
In so holding, the Court compared law enforcement’s use
of CSLI to GPS monitoring, noting that the “detailed,
encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled” data used to track a
person via their CSLI was qualitatively similar to the GPS
monitoring in Jones.190 Like GPS monitoring, access to CSLI is
“remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient compared to traditional
investigative tools.”191 Arguably, however, law enforcement’s
use of CSLI raises even greater privacy concerns than the GPS
monitoring in Jones because cell phones are almost “feature[s]
of human anatomy” that track the movements of their users

187. See id. at 2214–15 (“[R]equests for cell-site records lie at the
intersection of two lines of cases, both of which inform our understanding of
the privacy interests at stake.”); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
743 (1979) (holding that an individual does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the records of his dialed telephone numbers held by
the individual’s telephone company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
444–45 (1976) (holding that an individual does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in financial records voluntarily disclosed to a bank).
Compare United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (concluding that privacy concerns would be raised by GPS
tracking), with United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (holding
that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another”).
188. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (explaining that the seven days’
worth of CSLI from Sprint was the “pertinent period”).
189. See id. at 2217 n.3 (responding to the alternative argument that
“the acquisition of CSLI becomes a search only if it extends beyond a limited
period”).
190. See id. at 2216 (analogizing law enforcement’s use of CSLI in this
case to the GPS tracking of a vehicle; in both instances, the location
information is “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled”).
191. Id. at 2218.
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“nearly exactly.”192 Additionally, the retrospective nature of
CSLI grants law enforcement access to historical location
information, “a category of information [that is] otherwise
unknowable.”193
4. Case Law Applying the Katz Test to Law Enforcement’s Use
of Cell-Site Simulators
a. Maryland v. Andrews
In Maryland v. Andrews, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland considered whether “the use of a cellular tracking
device to locate Andrews’s phone violated the Fourth
Amendment.”194 Baltimore police had used a cell-site simulator
to locate Andrews at an acquaintance’s apartment.195 The court
concluded that “individuals have a reasonable expectation that
their cell phones will not be used as real-time tracking devices
by law enforcement, and—recognizing that the Fourth
Amendment protects people and not simply areas—that people
have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in
real-time cell phone location information.”196 According to the
Andrews court, therefore, “the use of a cell-site simulator . . . by
the government, requires a search warrant based on probable
cause and describing with particularity the object and manner
of the search, unless an established exception to the warrant
requirement applies.”197
In holding that Andrews had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the location information obtained by the cell-site
192. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014) (“[T]he proverbial
visitor from Mars might conclude [cell phones] were an important feature of
human anatomy.”).
193. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018).
194. Maryland v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 326 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 2016).
195. The Government also argued that Andrews lacked standing to
challenge the search because Andrews did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in an acquaintance’s residence. The Andrews court refused to rule
on the standing argument because it had “already determined that Andrews
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his aggregate and real-time
location information (CSLI) contained in his cell phone.” Id. at 352–53.
196. Id. at 327.
197. Id. at 395.
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simulator, the Andrews court rejected two propositions.198
First, the court rejected the idea that cell phone users
voluntarily convey their location information simply by
choosing to use their cell phones and to carry the devices on
their person.199 Second, the court dismissed the proposition
that cell phone users should expect that their information is
being sent directly to the police department.200
b. United States v. Lambis
In United States v. Lambis, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York also held that law
enforcement must obtain a search warrant supported by
probable cause before using a cell-site simulator.201 DEA
agents obtained Lambis’s cell phone number as part of their
investigation into an international drug trafficking
organization.202 The agents initially used CSLI to determine
the approximate location of Lambis’s cell phone, but the CSLI
was not precise enough to identify Lambis’s apartment
building.203 Using a cell-site simulator, a trained DEA
technician located Lambis’s apartment building and specific
apartment by isolating the signal emanating from Lambis’s
198. Id. at 392–93.
199. See id. at 392 (agreeing with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Graham that courts “cannot accept the proposition that cell phone
users volunteer to convey their location information simply by choosing to
activate and use their cell phones and to carry the devices on their person”
(quoting United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 355 (4th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 2700 (2018))).
200. See id. at 392–93 (accepting the circuit court’s finding that “no one
expects that their phone information is being sent directly to the police
department on their apparatus”).
201. See United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 609, 610 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) (explaining that, in light of Kyllo, DEA agents’ use of a cell-site
simulator to locate Lambis’s apartment was an “unreasonable search
because the ‘pings’ from Lambis’s cell phone to the nearest cell site were not
readily available ‘to anyone who wanted to look’ without the use of a cell-site
simulator”).
202. Id. at 609.
203. See id. (describing the CSLI as not precise enough to identify
Lambis’s specific apartment building, much less the specific unit in the
apartment complexes in the area).
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cell phone.204 Later that same day, Lambis’s father gave the
agents consent to enter the apartment,205 where they recovered
narcotics and other drug paraphernalia from Lambis’s
bedroom.206 Lambis filed a motion to suppress the evidence of
drugs and drug paraphernalia.207
The court held that the DEA agents’ warrantless use of a
cell-site simulator constituted an unreasonable search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.208 Relying heavily on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kyllo,209 the Lambis court
reasoned that the agents’ use of the cell-site simulator was a
search because the “‘pings’ from Lambis’s cell phone . . . were
not readily available ‘to anyone who wanted to look.’”210
c. Jones v. United States
In Jones v. United States, officers from the D.C.
Metropolitan Police Department used a cell-site simulator to
track a suspect wanted for two sexual assaults.211 The officers
204. See id. (“Activating the cell-site simulator, the DEA technician first
identified the apartment building with the strongest ping. Then, the
technician entered that apartment building and walked the halls until he
located the specific apartment where the signal was strongest.”).
205. See id. (noting that Lambis himself also gave his consent when DEA
agents asked to search his bedroom).
206. See id. (detailing the DEA agents’ seizure of narcotics, three digital
scales, empty zip lock bags, and other drug paraphernalia from Lambis’s
bedroom).
207. Id.
208. See id. at 611 (discussing the special significance afforded to the
home under the Fourth Amendment); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31
(2001) (“‘At the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.’” (citation omitted)).
209. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (holding that when “the Government uses
a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant”).
210. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 610 (quoting United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)).
211. See Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 707 (D.C. Ct. App. 2017)
(recounting that the officers’ review of the two victims’ phone records
revealed they both had received phone calls from Jones).
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believed their suspect, Jones, had stolen one of the victim’s cell
phones.212 To further their investigation, the officers sought
and obtained real-time CSLI from both Jones’s and the victim’s
telecommunications providers.213 This information placed the
two cell phones in the general vicinity of the Minnesota
Avenue Metro Station.214 In order to better pinpoint the
locations of the two cell phones, the officers drove a truck
equipped with a cell-site simulator around the station.215 Using
the cell-site simulator, the officers tracked Jones’s cell phone’s
signal to a parked vehicle.216 “Inside the [vehicle] were Mr.
Jones and Mr. Jones’s girlfriend, Nora Williams.”217
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the officers’
use of the cell-site simulator to locate Jones’s phone “invaded
[his] reasonable expectation of privacy and was thus a
search.”218 The court began its analysis with an “obvious fact”:
“[M]ost people have a cellphone and carry it with them
practically everywhere they go.”219 According to the court,
because cell phone usage is so pervasive, cell-site simulators
have “substantial potential to expose the [cell phone] owner’s
intimate personal information.”220 Cell phone tracking can, for
example, invade the cell phone owner’s “right to privacy in
one’s home”221 and can reveal “sensitive information about the

212. Id.
213. See id. at 708 (explaining that the information came in the form of
geographic coordinates that lacked a high degree of certainty).
214. See id. (“Despite the lack of precision in the location information,
Sergeant Perkins and his team were able to ‘tell that . . . one of the
[complainants’] phones and the [suspect’s] phone were traveling in the same
general direction . . . as if they were together.’” (citation omitted)).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 709.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 713.
219. Id. at 711 (citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395 (2014))
(“Finally, there is an element of pervasiveness that characterizes cell
phones . . . [n]ow it is the person who is not carrying a cell phone, with all
that it contains, who is the exception.”).
220. Id.
221. Id.
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[owner’s] ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations.’”222
The court walked through two additional considerations.
First, the court sought to distinguish cell-site simulators from
other electronic surveillance tools. Unlike the beepers used in
Knotts and Karo, “a cell-site simulator is a locating, not merely
a
tracking
device.”223
Thus,
“[w]ith
a
cell-site
simulator . . . police no longer need to track a person visually
from some starting location or physically install a tracking
device on an object that is, or will come into, his or her
possession.”224 Second, the court emphasized that because cell
phones are “dumb devices,” cell phone users are not able to
insulate themselves from cell-site simulators.225 The only
countermeasure a cell phone user “can undertake is to turn off
his or her cellphone or its radios (put it in ‘airplane mode’),
thus forgoing its use as a communication device.”226 The court
concluded that, taken together, the information law
enforcement can obtain by using a cell-site simulator and the
means by which cell-site simulator surveillance is carried out
mandates “that under ordinary circumstances, the use of a
cell-site simulator to locate a person through his or her
cellphone invades the person’s actual, legitimate, and

222. Id. at 712. The court is relying on Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence
in United States v. Jones. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). In Jones, the government tracked Antoine
Jones’s movements for four weeks. Id. at 403. Here, the officers used the
cell-site simulator to track Prince Jones’s movements for only a few hours.
See Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 709 (D.C. Ct. App. 2017)
(describing the arrest of Prince Jones as taking place at 11:30 AM on the
same day that the officers deployed the cell-site simulator).
223. Id. at 713.
224. Id. at 712.
225. See id. at 713
[T]he cell-site simulator exploits a security vulnerability in the
phone—the fact that cellphones are, in the words of the defense
expert, “dumb devices,” unable to differentiate between a
legitimate cellular tower and a cell-site simulator masquerading
as one—and actively induces the phone to divulge its identifying
information. Once the phone is identified, it can be located.
(citation omitted).
226. Id.
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reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her location
information and is a search.”227
III. Four Factors Courts Should Consider When Analyzing Law
Enforcement’s Use of a Cell-Site Simulator
Taken together, Andrews, Lambis, and Jones (D.C.)
indicate that when law enforcement officers use a cell-site
simulator, they conduct a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. To the extent these cases suggest that law
enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators always amounts to a
Fourth Amendment search, these holdings are overly-broad
and rest on “too-generic description[s] of the facts.”228 This
Note proposes that courts should consider the following factors
in determining, on a case-by-case basis,229 whether law
enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator constituted a search:
(1) whether the surveillance infringed on a constitutionally
protected area, (2) the duration of the surveillance, (3) whether
the surveillance was active or passive, and (4) the nature of the
information obtained by the surveillance.230
227. Id. at 714–15.
228. See id. at 728 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (arguing that, despite the
commendable concern about threats to privacy that flow from advances in
law enforcement technology, the court’s conclusion was based on a
“too-generic description of the facts surrounding use of the cell-site
simulator”).
229. See Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 528 (6th Cir.
2008) (“The Fourth Amendment is designed to account for an unpredictable
and limitless range of factual circumstances, and accordingly it generally
should be applied after those circumstances unfold, not before.” (emphasis
added)); Brief of Professor Orin S. Kerr as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellant, In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600
(5th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-20884) (arguing that ex post review of law
enforcement’s actions is “essential because Fourth Amendment law is
extremely fact-specific” and courts “cannot apply the Fourth Amendment
when no facts yet exist”).
230. The Kyllo Court emphasized that a thermal imager is a
sophisticated device that is “not in general public use.” Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). Like thermal imagers, cell-site simulators are
highly sophisticated devices that are not generally available to the public.
See Brown & Leese, supra note 35, at 12 (describing both the non-disclosure
agreements imposed by Harris Corporation, the primary manufacturer of
cell-site simulators, and the hefty purchase price—one cell-site simulator
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A. Whether the Surveillance Infringed on a Constitutionally
Protected Area
The first factor courts should consider when analyzing a
case involving a cell-site simulator is whether law enforcement
officers used the cell-site simulator to monitor an individual in
a constitutionally protected area, such as the home.231 If, by
using the cell-site simulator, law enforcement officers obtain
information regarding the interior of an individual’s home,
then a Fourth Amendment search has taken place.232 In such
cases, courts need not consider the remaining factors and can
instead proceed to analyze the reasonableness of the search.233
Thus, to the extent that the Lambis court relied on an
individual’s right to “retreat into his own home and there be
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion,”234 it was
correct in concluding that law enforcement’s warrantless use of

costs around $100,000). Thus, the sophisticated nature of cell-site simulators
is a constant and does not need to be considered as an independent factor.
231. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (“The Fourth Amendment’s protection of
the home has never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of
information obtained. In Silverman, for example, we made clear that any
physical invasion of the structure of the home, ‘by even a fraction of an inch,’
was too much . . . .” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512
(1961))).
232. See id. (“In the home, our cases show, all details are
intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government
eyes.”); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984) (holding that by
using a beeper to monitor a private residence, law enforcement officers
violated the Fourth Amendment rights of those individuals with privacy
interests in the residence).
233. See id. at 31 (relying on the foundational notion that, at its very
core, the Fourth Amendment protects “the right of man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion”
(citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))); Brown &
Leese, supra note 35, at 14 (arguing that if the “searches in Karo and Kyllo
were in violation of the Fourth Amendment, so too would be the use of a
cell-site simulator to track a cell phone inside a person’s home”); see also New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (emphasizing that reasonableness
is the “fundamental command” of the Fourth Amendment).
234. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
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a cell-site simulator violated Lambis’s reasonable expectation
of privacy.235
If, however, the cell-site simulator does not reveal
information regarding the interior of an individual’s home,236
then additional analysis is required.237 Recall that under
Knotts, for example, surveilling an individual in public is not a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.238

235. See United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 610 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) (“The DEA’s use of the cell-site simulator revealed details of the home
that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion, namely, that the target cell phone was located within Lambis’s
apartment.” (citation omitted)). The Lambis Court should have limited its
holding to these facts, but instead held that “[a]bsent a search warrant, the
Government may not turn a citizen’s cell phone into a tracking device.” Id. at
611.
236. Andrews presents an interesting question: did Andrews have the
same expectations of privacy in an acquaintance’s apartment as he would
have had in his own home? Put differently, did Andrews have standing to
bring a Fourth Amendment claim? The Andrews court declined to address
the standing issue because it had “already determined that Andrews had a
reasonable
expectation
of
privacy
in
his . . . location
information . . . contained in his cell phone.” Maryland v. Andrews, 134 A.3d
324, 353 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 2016). In future cell-site simulator questions,
however, courts should be prepared to analyze whether the target is able to
establish “that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the
challenged search.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n.1 (1978).
237. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 729 F.2d 475, 483–84 (7th Cir.
1984) (holding that individuals have a reduced expectation of privacy in
automobiles because automobiles are subject to pervasive and continuing
governmental regulation); see also LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 11.3(b)
(discussing reasonable expectations of privacy in residential premises).
Compare Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96–97 (1990) (holding that one’s
“status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show . . . an expectation of
privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable”),
with Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (holding that two visitors
who came to an apartment for the sole purpose of packaging the cocaine, had
never been to the apartment before, and were only in the apartment for 2.5
hours lacked standing to challenge an officer’s search of the apartment).
238. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (explaining
that because the officers could have visually surveilled the defendant while
he was driving in public, the “enhancement of their senses” provided by the
beeper “raise[d] no constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not
also raise”).
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B. The Duration of the Surveillance
The duration of law enforcement’s surveillance was a
significant factor for the Supreme Court in both United States
v. Jones and Carpenter v. United States. Accordingly, the
second factor courts should consider in analyzing a cell-site
simulator case is the duration of the cell-site simulator
surveillance. In Jones, law enforcement surveilled Jones’s
movements for four weeks by installing a GPS tracking device
on his vehicle.239 Writing in concurrence, Justice Alito
concluded that the “lengthy monitoring in this case constituted
a search under the Fourth Amendment.”240 In Carpenter, FBI
agents obtained 127 days’ worth of Carpenter’s CSLI.241
Although the Carpenter Court refrained from issuing a bright
line rule regarding precisely how many days’ worth of CSLI
constitute a Fourth Amendment search,242 it concluded that
“accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search.”243
The cell-site simulator surveillance at issue in Andrews,
Lambis, and Jones (D.C.) was nowhere near as lengthy as the
surveillance in Jones or Carpenter. Generally, law enforcement
officers use cell-site simulators as a last resort in their
surveillance arsenal, only after they have been tracking a
target for some time or are already aware of a target’s general
location. In Andrews, for example, officers obtained Andrews’s

239. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2001) (“Over the
next 28 days, the Government used the device to track the vehicle’s
movements.”).
240. Id. at 431.
241. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018)
(describing the magistrate judge’s order to MetroPCS, which produced 127
days’ worth of Carpenter’s cell phone records).
242. See id. at 2217 n.3 (declining to decide whether there is a “limited
period for which the Government may obtain an individual’s historical CSLI
free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny”); see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (“We
need not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this
vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4-week
mark.”).
243. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3.
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CSLI for the period from April 5 to May 5, pen register244 data
for a period of sixty days, and precision GPS data from
Andrews’s cell phone before ever using the cell-site
simulator.245 After tracking Andrews’s cell phone’s location to
“the area of 5000 Clifton Avenue,” the officers deployed the
cell-site simulator, which was able to pinpoint the cell phone’s
location as “inside the residence at 5032 Clifton Avenue.”246
The whole process took no more than a few hours. Cell-site
simulators were used for similarly brief periods of time in
Lambis and Jones (D.C.).247 Thus, under Jones and Carpenter,
the generally brief duration of cell-site simulator surveillance
should cut against a finding that law enforcement’s use of a
cell-site simulator constituted a Fourth Amendment search.
C. Active Versus Passive Surveillance
Courts should also consider the distinction between active,
labor-intensive surveillance and passive surveillance when
analyzing whether law enforcement’s use of a cell-site
simulator constituted a search.248 The Supreme Court has
often emphasized the ease with which surveillance can be
carried out when balancing the government’s interest in
surveillance against an individual’s expectations of privacy.249
244. See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977) (“A
pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a
telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the
telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not
indicate whether calls are actually completed.”).
245. Maryland v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 328 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 2016).
246. Id. at 329.
247. See Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 708 (D.C. Ct. App. 2017)
(describing the officers driving around the area of a specified metro station
with a cell-site simulator in the back of their vehicle); United States v.
Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (describing the DEA
technician walking the halls of Lambis’s apartment building with a cell-site
simulator).
248. The distinction between active and passive surveillance should not
be confused with the distinction between active and passive cell-site
simulators. See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text (discussing the
differences between active and passive cell-site simulators).
249. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) (“[B]ecause GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to

LIMITED PRIVACY IN “PINGS”

1025

Whereas prolonged surveillance was difficult, costly, and
therefore rarely undertaken in the “pre-computer age,”
technological advances have allowed law enforcement to
surveil more targets while expending less time and fewer
resources.250
As noted by Justice Alito in Jones, without a GPS device,
surveilling Jones’s vehicle for four weeks would have “required
a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial
surveillance.”251 Thus, “[o]nly an investigation of unusual
importance could have justified such an expenditure of law
enforcement.”252 By placing a GPS tracking device on Jones’s
vehicle, however, law enforcement officers were able to
passively track the vehicle’s movements for twenty-eight
days.253 Passive surveillance was also an issue for the
Carpenter Court, where Chief Justice Roberts likened GPS
tracking to law enforcement’s use of CSLI: both are
inexpensive and “remarkably easy.”254 In Carpenter, FBI
agents were able to access a comprehensive catalogue of
Carpenter’s historical location information with “just the click
of a button.”255 Under both Jones and Carpenter, the Court
indicated that when technology enables law enforcement to
surveil a target passively, for extended periods of time, such
technology is more likely to violate the reasonableness
mandate of the Fourth Amendment.
conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds
surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law
enforcement practices.”); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004)
(balancing the gravity of the public interest and the severity of the
interference with individual liberty in determining the reasonableness of a
checkpoint stop).
250. Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 403 (majority opinion) (describing how, in exchange for the
initial placement of the GPS device and once having to replace the device’s
battery, the government was able to obtain more than 2,000 pages of location
data over the four-week period).
254. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
255. See id. at 2218 (“With just the click of a button, the Government can
access each carrier’s deep repository of historical location information at
practically no expense.”).
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Using a cell-site simulator is more labor-intensive than
using a GPS device or obtaining CSLI. Unlike a GPS device, a
cell-site simulator does not allow law enforcement officers to
passively surveil a target. In Jones (D.C.), for example, officers
had to drive around with a cell-site simulator in the back of
their vehicle before the cell-site simulator could connect with
Jones’s cell phone.256 Similarly, in Lambis, a trained DEA
technician had to physically walk the cell-site simulator
around an apartment complex before he was able to locate
Lambis’s specific apartment.257
Thus, law enforcement officers engage in active, rather
than passive surveillance when they use cell-site simulators.
Surveillance conducted using a cell-site simulator should not
run afoul of the Fourth Amendment simply because cell-site
simulators allow law enforcement officers to do their jobs more
efficiently.258 When law enforcement officers are engaged in
active, hands-on surveillance, they are less likely to surveil a
target for a prolonged period of time. This factor should also
generally cut against a finding that law enforcement’s use of a
cell-site simulator constituted a Fourth Amendment search.
D. The Nature of the Information Obtained by the Surveillance
The fourth factor courts should consider when analyzing a
cell-site simulator case is the nature of the information
obtained by the cell-site simulator. If, as in Andrews, Lambis,
and Jones (D.C.), the information is limited to the target cell
phone’s “pings,” then this factor should cut against a finding

256. See Jones, 168 A.3d at 708 (describing the officers driving around
the area of a specified metro station with a cell-site simulator in the back of
their vehicle).
257. See Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 609 (describing the DEA technician
walking the halls of Lambis’s apartment building with a cell-site simulator).
258. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (“We have
never equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality, and we decline to do
so now.”); Richard H. McAdams, Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts: Beeper
Monitoring and Collective Fourth Amendment Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 297, 314
(1985) (“Individuals understand that police sometimes engage in extended
visual surveillance. Our society has accepted the ancient surveillance
technique of physical shadowing since the founding of our government.”).
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that the use of the cell-site simulator constituted a search.259
When used in this way, cell-site simulators are similar to the
beeper devices in Knotts and Karo.260 Under Knotts and Karo,
the use of cell-site simulators does not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search unless the pings reveal information
regarding the interior of an individual’s own home.261
The location information generated by the cell-site
simulators in Andrews, Lambis, and Jones (D.C.) is
distinguishable from the CSLI at issue in Carpenter. In
Carpenter, the prosecution used Carpenter’s CSLI to generate
maps placing Carpenter’s phone near the locations of four
separate robberies at the date and time each robbery took
place.262 Unlike CSLI, cell-site simulators cannot be used to
generate extensive records chronicling a target user’s past
movements.263 Whereas CSLI is collected and stored by
wireless carriers for years, a cell-site simulator only tracks a
cell phone’s location in real-time and does not store this
information.264 The historical nature of CSLI was essential to
the Carpenter Court’s holding: “We do not express a view on
matters not before us . . . real-time CSLI or ‘tower-dumps’ (a
download of information on all the devices that connected to a
particular cell site during a particular interval).”265
259. See, e.g., United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 609
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“The [cell-site simulator] then calculates the strength of the
‘pings’ until the target phone is pinpointed.”).
260. See McAdams, supra note 258, at 313–14 (explaining that beepers
function like radio transmitters and therefore require “continued observation
to discover someone’s identity, route, and final destination”).
261. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the interplay between the Supreme
Court’s holdings in Knotts and Karo).
262. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (“In the Government’s view, the
location records clinched the case: They confirmed that Carpenter was right
where the . . . robbery was at the exact time of the robbery.” (citation
omitted)).
263. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 37, at 17 (illustrating the following
uses for cell-site simulators: (1) identifying unknown phones currently used
by the target, (2) locating devices, and (3) selectively blocking devices).
264. See id. at 24–25 (pointing out that a warrant is not needed for law
enforcement’s use of digital analyzers and cell-site simulators when they are
employed to intercept non-content data, such as real-time location
information).
265. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
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Law enforcement’s uses of cell-site simulators in Andrews,
Lambis, and Jones (D.C.) were similarly distinguishable from
accessing the contents of a cell phone, which the Supreme
Court has held constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.266 If,
as has been suggested by the EFF, law enforcement were to
use a cell-site simulator to log cell phones’ metadata and
content,267 then under Riley v. California,268 the use of the
cell-site simulator would constitute a search.269 In Riley, the
Court considered whether law enforcement may, as part of a
search incident to lawful arrest,270 search the digital
information stored on an arrestee’s cell phone without a
warrant.271 The Court held that law enforcement must
generally obtain a search warrant before searching a cell
phone and accessing its digitally stored information.272
Contrary to the holdings in Andrews, Lambis, and Jones
(D.C.), using a cell-site simulator does not categorically
constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Courts should analyze
each of the four factors discussed above to determine whether,
by using a cell-site simulator, law enforcement officers engaged
in a Fourth Amendment search.

266. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (holding that
officers must secure a warrant before conducting a search of data on cell
phones).
267. See Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers, supra note 35 (“Some
cell-site simulators may have advanced features allowing law enforcement to
intercept communications or even alter the content of communications.”).
268. 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
269. See id. at 403 (“Our answer to the question of what police must do
before searching [the contents of] a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is
accordingly simple—get a warrant.”).
270. See id. at 391 (“The search incident to arrest exception rests not only
on the heightened government interests at stake in a volatile arrest
situation, but also on an arrestee’s reduced privacy interests upon being
taken into police custody.”).
271. See id. at 378 (considering the “common question” of “whether the
police may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone
seized from an individual who has been arrested”).
272. See id. at 386 (declining to extend the search incident to a lawful
arrest exception to the warrant requirement to the digital information stored
on cell phones).
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IV. A Search Does Not Violate the Fourth Amendment Unless It
Is Unreasonable
Assuming, after consideration of the four factors discussed
in Part III, a court concludes that law enforcement’s use of a
cell-site simulator constituted a Fourth Amendment search,
the court must next determine whether the search was
reasonable. The reasonableness requirement is the ultimate
touchstone and “fundamental command” of the Fourth
Amendment.273 In drafting the Fourth Amendment, the
Framers recognized that searches and seizures were “too
valuable to law enforcement to prohibit them entirely,” but
that “they should be slowed down.”274 In determining the
reasonableness of a search or seizure, courts measure both the
permissibility of the initial decision to search or seize and the
permissible scope of those intrusions.275
A. Four Models for Determining Reasonableness
Despite the importance of reasonableness to the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has failed to settle on a single
reasonableness standard. Professor Thomas Clancy suggests
that historically, the Supreme Court has used four models to
determine the reasonableness of a search or seizure: (1) the
warrant preference model, (2) the individualized suspicion
model, (3) the balancing model, and (4) the common law plus
balancing model.276

273. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
274. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 75 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting)
Obviously, those who wrote this Fourth Amendment knew from
experience that searches and seizures were too valuable to law
enforcement to prohibit them entirely, but also knew at the same
time that while searches or seizures must not be stopped,
they should be slowed down, and warrants should be issued only
after studied caution.
275. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (determining that the
reasonableness of a search requires a twofold inquiry: first, consider
“whether the . . . action was justified at its inception,” and second, determine
whether the search as conducted “was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place”).
276. CLANCY, supra note 87, at 682–85.
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Under the warrant preference model, “a search or seizure
is not unreasonable, and therefore not forbidden, when it is
carried out with a warrant issued pursuant to the criteria set
out in the Warrant Clause.”277 Under the individualized
suspicion model, for a search or seizure to be reasonable, law
enforcement must have either probable cause or reasonable
suspicion, but not necessarily a warrant, prior to executing the
search or seizure.278 Under the balancing model, the
reasonableness of a search or seizure hinges on the balancing
of governmental interests against individual interests.279
Under the common law plus balancing model, courts first ask
“whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or
seizure under the common law when the Amendment was
framed.”280 Should that inquiry “yield no answer,” courts next
“evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of
reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to
which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.”281

277. Id. at 682. Justice Frankfurter, a staunch advocate for the warrant
preference model, argued that “[o]ne cannot wrench ‘unreasonable searches’
from the text, context, and historic content of the Fourth Amendment.”
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
278. See id. at 685 (discussing the individualized suspicion model); see
also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–54 (1925) (creating the
“automobile exception” and holding that a warrant is not always required,
and thus is not the sine qua non of reasonableness).
279. See Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967)
(balancing “the need to search against the invasion which the search
entail[ed]”); see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 306 (1999) (noting
that the “practical realities” associated with balancing competing
governmental and individual interests “militate in favor of the needs of law
enforcement, and against a personal-privacy interest that is ordinarily
weak”).
280. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299.
281. Id. at 300.
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B. The Warrant Preference Model Is Best-Suited to Analyzing
the Reasonableness of Cell-Site Simulators
Of the four models, the warrant preference model is
best-suited to cases involving cell-site simulators. Under the
warrant preference model, a search or seizure is unreasonable,
and therefore unconstitutional, when carried out without a
warrant issued pursuant to the criteria set out in the Warrant
Clause.282 Although courts no longer categorically apply the
warrant preference model, the Supreme Court continues to use
this model as a means of determining the reasonableness of a
search or seizure, particularly in cases in the criminal law
enforcement context.283
Generally, law enforcement officers use cell-site
simulators in the “enterprise of ferreting out crime.”284 Law
enforcement’s objectives in using cell-site simulators are penal,
rather than regulatory.285 As such, the two reasonableness
282. See CLANCY, supra note 87, at 682 (discussing the origins of the
warrant preference model); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.”).
283. See id. at 684 (“The warrant preference model remains one of the
methods the Court uses to measure reasonableness”); see also, e.g., Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“Searches conducted
without warrants have been held unlawful ‘notwithstanding facts
unquestionably showing probable cause’ . . . .”); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1963) (discussing the need for the “deliberate
impartial judgment of a judicial officer” to be “interposed between the citizen
and the police”).
284. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (explaining
that a “neutral and detached magistrate,” rather than an officer engaged in
the “enterprise of ferreting out crime,” should be the one to determine
“[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search”).
285. See Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics:
Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 408 (1988)
(arguing that terms such as “administrative search” or “inspection” do not
effectively limit the Supreme Court’s holding in Camara to administrative
search cases); see also Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294–95
(1984) (distinguishing between administrative and conventional search
warrants based on whether the objective of the search is criminal
evidence); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504–05 (1978) (discussing
whether the government’s intent in conducting a search was administrative
or criminal).
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balancing models, which have been relegated to the
administrative search or “community-caretaking” context, are
inapplicable to law enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators.286
Should courts begin regularly applying the warrant
preference model to cases involving cell-site simulators, law
enforcement can “more easily predict whether their actions
will be considered constitutional.”287 Additionally, cell-site
simulators are often used in conjunction with other
surveillance technology, such as CSLI, which require law
enforcement officers to obtain a search warrant.288 Thus, a
request to use a cell-site simulator can and should be included
in law enforcement’s application for a search warrant. As with
other surveillance technology, when law enforcement officers
procure a search warrant, “there is little question that the
subsequent search will be deemed valid.”289 A general rule that
a search warrant is required, qualified by necessary
exceptions, will provide law enforcement officers with
much-needed clarity.290

286. See Michael R. Diminio, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community
Caretaking, Assistance Searches, and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1487 (2009) (explaining that, when a search or
seizure is undertaken for purposes other than law enforcement, the
“ordinary presumption that warrantless searches are unreasonable ceases to
apply”).
287. See Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1139 (2012)
(“Police officers can more easily predict whether their actions will be
considered constitutional under the warrant preference view than under an
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that just tells them they need to act
‘reasonably.’”).
288. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018)
(holding that law enforcement officers must obtain a search warrant
supported by probable cause prior to accessing historic cell-site location
information); see also United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 608
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (writing that DEA agents had sought a warrant for pen
register information and CSLI for Lambis’s cell phone before using the
cell-site simulator).
289. Lee, supra note 287, at 1139.
290. See id. (describing the Supreme Court’s reliance on providing law
enforcement officers with clear guidance); see also, e.g., Illinois v. Lafayette,
462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983) (stressing the importance of clear rules for
inventories of arrestees); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458–60
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V. Conclusion
Electronic surveillance technology has undoubtedly come a
long way since the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States
v. Knotts and United States v. Karo.291 The cell-site simulators
at issue in Andrews, Lambis, and Jones (D.C.) are far more
sophisticated than the beepers in Knotts and Karo, or even the
thermal imager in Kyllo v. United States.292 The Supreme
Court’s more recent decisions in Carpenter v. United States
and Riley v. California seem to indicate that cell phones and
the location information they generate are entitled to special
consideration under the Fourth Amendment.293 Thus, it is
tempting to conclude that cell-site simulators, by virtue of
their sophistication, efficiency, and interaction with cell
phones, categorically violate the Fourth Amendment’s
mandate that “the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”294 The courts in
Andrews, Lambis, and Jones (D.C.) adopted this rationale.
Taken together, their holdings indicate that any time law
enforcement officers use a cell-site simulator, they conduct a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.295
The courts in Andrews, Lambis, and Jones (D.C.) were
clearly concerned about the threats to privacy that coincide
with advances in surveillance technology.296 While this concern
(1981) (emphasizing the need for “bright lines” regarding permissible scope
of searches incident to lawful arrests).
291. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the beeper devices used in Knotts
and Karo).
292. See supra Part I.B (explaining how cell-site simulators work).
293. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (holding that “an individual
maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical
movements as captured through CSLI”); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373,
393 (2014) (recognizing that in light of the “immense storage capacity” of
modern cell phones, police officers must generally obtain a warrant before
searching the contents of a cell phone).
294. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
295. See supra Part III (critiquing the holdings in Andrews, Lambis, and
Jones (D.C.)).
296. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 51 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (commending the Court’s concern “about the threats to privacy
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is commendable, in ruling on cell-site simulator cases, courts
cannot “rest[] on a too-generic description of the facts”
surrounding the use of the cell-site simulator.297 As with any
issue that implicates the Fourth Amendment, it is important
to be clear about what actually occurred.298 Instead of adhering
to the categorical rationales utilized in Andrews, Lambis, and
Jones (D.C.), courts should analyze the four factors discussed
in Part III to determine, on a case-by-case basis,299 whether
law enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator constituted a
search.300 If a court concludes that the use of a cell-site
simulator constituted a search, then that search should be
considered unreasonable, and in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, if it was conducted without a search warrant.301
Broader, more comprehensive regulations regarding the use of
cell-site simulators are better left to Congress and state and
local legislatures.302

that may flow from advances in the technology available to the law
enforcement profession”).
297. See Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 728 (D.C. Ct. App. 2017)
(Thompson, J., dissenting) (arguing that, despite the commendable concern
about threats to privacy that flow from advances in law enforcement
technology, the court’s conclusion was based on a “too-generic description of
the facts surrounding use of the cell-site simulator”).
298. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (emphasizing
that “[i]t is important to be clear about what occurred in this case”).
299. See Brief of Professor Orin S. Kerr as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellant, In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600
(5th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-20884) (arguing that ex post review of law
enforcement’s actions is “essential because Fourth Amendment law is
extremely fact-specific” and courts “cannot apply the Fourth Amendment
when no facts yet exist”).
300. See supra Part III (discussing the four factors: (1) whether the
surveillance infringed on a constitutionally protected area, (2) the duration of
the surveillance, (3) whether the surveillance was active or passive, and (4)
the nature of the information obtained by the surveillance).
301. See supra Part IV.B (arguing that the warrant preference model of
determining reasonableness should be applied to cases involving law
enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators).
302. See, e.g., DeGeer, supra note 23, at 352 (arguing that Congress
should draft a bill “enumerating when, how, and by whom a cell-site
simulator may be used”).

